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“Education is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change 
the world” 
– Nelson Mandela 
Education.  Say the word and a hundred different things come to 
mind.  Bad teachers, good teachers, old textbooks, science experiments, 
politicians fighting, kids at recess, money.  There are many different 
views on what makes a quality education, but most everyone agrees with 
Mandela—education can be the silver bullet.  Education can propel an 
immigrant who barely knows English to the chairperson position in a 
Fortune 500 company.1  It can reconcile groups of people that have 
clashed for decades.2  And education can show children a world they 
may not dare dream of—a world without limitations. 
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Kansans have been debating the best way to educate our children 
since the state was a territory.3  The nation has been debating it since 
long before that.4  Today, the debate is about money—who gets it and 
how much?  Over the past several decades the debate about how best to 
fund education has taken center stage, both in Kansas and across the 
nation.5  School administrators, parents, and education advocates grew 
tired of lobbying state legislators for more funding and went to the 
courts—ushering in decades of school-finance litigation.6 
Courts across the nation have heard so many variations on the school 
funding theme that commentators are able to divide these suits into three 
waves: national equity, state-based equity, and adequacy.7  The first 
wave quickly fizzled when the Supreme Court declined to deem 
education a fundamental right under the Federal Constitution.8  Thwarted 
but not discouraged, advocates brought litigation in state courts 
challenging the equity of school-finance systems.9  Although advocates 
saw some success in these state-based equity cases, they did not achieve 
the plaintiffs’ goal—more funding.10  Thus entered the third and current 
wave: adequacy litigation. 
Adequacy litigation aims to circumvent legislative lobbying and win 
increased school funding through court orders.11  State courts disagree 
about the judiciary’s role in adequacy focused school-finance litigation.12  
Where equity litigation strictly asked the judiciary to determine whether 
                                                          
tini.gov.uk/international-fund-for-irelands-sharing-in-education-programme/a-final-evaluation-of-
the-international-fund-for-irelands-sharing-in-education-programme.pdf (describing the success of 
youth educational programs in reconciling conflict between Protestants and Catholics in Northern 
Ireland). 
 3.  Infra Part II.A. 
 4.  See Race Forward, Historical Timeline of Public Education in the U.S., RACE FORWARD, 
https://www.raceforward.org/research/reports/historical-timeline-public-education-us (last visited 
May 24, 2015) (“1779: Thomas Jefferson proposes a two-track educational system, with different 
tracks in his words for ‘the laboring and the learned.’  Scholarship would allow a very few of the 
laboring class to advance, Jefferson says, by ‘raking a few geniuses from the rubbish.’”). 
 5.  See infra Part II.B–C. 
 6.  See infra Part II.B. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  See infra Parts II.B, III.A. 
 12.  Compare Neb. Coal. for Educ. Equity & Adequacy v. Heineman, 731 N.W.2d 164, 183 
(Neb. 2007) (finding that a lack of constitutional, qualitative standards weighs heavily against 
justiciability in school-finance litigation), with Gannon v. Kansas, 319 P.3d 1196, 1208–31 (Kan. 
2014) (finding adequacy justiciable by denying the State’s attempt to characterize the issue as a 
political question). 
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state education funds were distributed equitably among school districts, 
adequacy litigation asks the court to determine how much money is 
required to fund an adequate education.13  Courts hearing adequacy 
litigation usually must first decide a separation of powers problem 
concerning the proper role of the legislature and judiciary in school 
funding.14 Adequacy plaintiffs have had great success in winning cases, 
but not resolving them15—an adequacy case has been pending in one 
state court for more than fifteen years.16 
Like most states, Kansas included education in its constitution.17  
Article VI of the Kansas Constitution requires the legislature to provide 
suitable funding to support free public schools.  Article VI has spawned 
decades of school funding challenges, particularly equity and adequacy 
litigation—the most recent challenge coming in Gannon v. Kansas18 in 
March of 2014.19  Gannon was the first time the Kansas Supreme Court 
addressed whether adequacy challenges violate separation of powers 
principles.20  The court found adequacy justiciable and imported a vague 
seven-part test.21  Gannon also adopted a test for determining whether 
state funds are equitably distributed among schools: school districts must 
“have reasonably equal access to substantially similar educational 
opportunity through similar tax effort.”22  The court, however, did not 
explain how to apply this rule in future litigation.  “Educational 
opportunity” itself is a phrase that lacks a definition; even the scholar 
who first used the phrase failed to define it.23 
This Comment argues that the Kansas Supreme Court went too far 
and not far enough in Gannon.  Adequacy is a popular trend in school-
finance litigation and, although an adequate education is admirable and 
necessary, it is no place for the courts.  Adequacy presents a non-
justiciable political question under Article VI of the Kansas Constitution.  
First, and most importantly, the decision on how best to provide funding 
                                                          
 13.  See infra Parts III.A.2, B. 
 14.  See, e.g., Heineman, 731 N.W.2d at 179 (discussing political question and adequacy 
litigation); Gannon, 319 P.3d at 1216–31 (discussing political question and adequacy litigation). 
 15.  See infra Part III.A.2. 
 16.  Abbott v. Burke, 710 A.2d 450 (N.J. 1998). 
 17.  KAN. CONST. art. VI. 
 18.  319 P.3d 1196 (Kan. 2014). 
 19.  Infra Part II.C. 
 20.  Gannon, 319 P.3d at 1216. 
 21.  Id. at 1236. 
 22.  Id. at 1239. 
 23.  James S. Coleman, What is Meant by ‘an Equal Educational Opportunity’?, 1 OXFORD 
REV. EDUC. 27, 27 (1975). 
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for schools is committed to the legislature.  And not only is funding 
committed to the legislature, the Article VI term used to support the 
court’s decision to hear adequacy cases was “suitable”—a term too 
vague to provide judicially discoverable and manageable standards.  The 
text and history of Article VI, as well as separation of powers principles, 
lean heavily in favor of deeming adequacy litigation a non-justiciable 
political question in Kansas.  On the other hand, Kansas courts have a 
long history of hearing equity cases.  Accordingly, courts and advocates 
should focus on Gannon’s equity test.  In applying Gannon’s equity test, 
the court should focus on a formulation that increases resources to the 
less advantaged students and districts—a concept this Comment calls 
“vertical equity.”  Applying Gannon’s equity test from a vertical equity 
perspective allows the court to aid the State in fulfilling its constitutional 
mandate to educate Kansans for a better tomorrow. 
This Comment starts by illustrating the history of public-education 
laws and funding in Kansas.24  Part II provides a brief discussion of the 
evolution of school-finance litigation in Kansas and across the nation.25  
Part III begins with a discussion of adequacy’s non-justiciability under 
the Kansas Constitution and an illustration of adequacy litigation’s 
practical problems.26  Part III then examines what equity as a general 
concept means and the two types of equity often discussed in school-
funding literature.27  Finally, this Comment proposes that courts adopt a 
vertical equity perspective when applying Gannon’s equity test in future 
litigation.28 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Education in Kansas: Schools Before Statehood 
Kansas’s investment in education began before the state was actually 
a state.29  In 1851, the Kansas Territory established the soon-to-be-state’s 
first free public school in Council Grove.30  By the 1870s, log-cabin 
schools were popping up throughout the state and by 1885 Kansas was 
                                                          
 24.  Infra Part II.A. 
 25.  Infra Part II.B–C. 
 26.  Infra Part III.A. 
 27.  Infra Part III.B. 
 28.  Infra Part III.C. 
 29.  See SHERRILL MARTINEZ & LUE ANN SNIDER, KAN. STATE DEP’T OF EDUC., HISTORY OF 
KANSAS EDUCATION 3 (2001). 
 30.  Id. at 6. 
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investing in high schools.31  The young state’s dedication to education 
went beyond simply erecting schools.  From the start, Kansas was 
concerned with the level of education it was providing children.  As early 
as 1873, the state was requiring would-be teachers to pass certification 
exams before they would be deemed qualified to teach.32  State training 
schools for teachers soon followed.33 
1. Funding a Quality Education in the Sunflower State 
Fast forward to the 1900s and Kansas is still focused on education.  
The famous Brown v. Board of Education case, decided in 1954, sprang 
from the state’s capital—Topeka.34  However, Kansans were concerned 
with much more than just racial equity, they were also concerned with 
equity of educational opportunity.  Throughout the 1950s, Kansas 
provided reimbursements to programs aimed at educating the 
handicapped, and in 1969 funding for special-education programs 
became law.35  By the 1970s, Kansans had lobbied for a multi-track 
curriculum designed to aid student success by providing options for at-
risk students.36  There was never a time that Kansans were not concerned 
with providing their children with a high quality education—it was 
ingrained in Kansas from the start that education is key to growing the 
state.37 
Kansas’s commitment to funding public education has been 
enshrined in the state’s laws and constitution almost as long as it has 
lived in the people’s hearts.  In 1854, seven years before being admitted 
to the Union, Kansas passed its first school-funding law as part of The 
Organic Act.38  The Organic Act devoted tracts of state land to fund 
common schools.39  Five years later, the people of Kansas adopted a 
territorial constitution that adopted The Organic Act’s school funding 
provision.40  In 1861, Kansas finally became a state and its newly minted 
                                                          
 31.  Id. at 3–4. 
 32.  Id. at 8. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 35.  MARTINEZ & SNIDER, supra note 29, at 6. 
 36.  Id. at 4. 
 37.  Id. at 3. 
 38.  Unified Sch. Dist. No. 229 v. Kansas, 885 P.2d 1170, 1175 (Kan. 1994); Organic Act: An 
Act to Organize the Territory of Kansas, ch. 59, 10 Stat. 283 (1854). 
 39.  Charles Berger, Article, Equity Without Adjudication: Kansas School Finance Reform and 
the 1992 School District Finance and Quality Performance Act, 27 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 3–4 (1998). 
 40.  KAN. CONST. ORDINANCE § 6 (1859). 
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constitution included even more support for school funding than the 
territorial constitution and Organic Act.41  Article VI, Section Four of 
The Kansas Constitution of 1861 provided that “income of the State 
school funds shall be disbursed . . . to the treasurers of the several school 
districts, in equitable proportion to the number of children and youth 
resident therein.”42  Although local taxes provided a large portion of the 
early schools’ funding, the constitution was concerned with disbursing 
state funds equitably and succeeded in establishing “a sort of frontier 
equality in [the] system.”43 
Adoption of Article VI was not the end of school funding efforts in 
Kansas.  In 1911, Kansas passed a law providing supplemental funding 
to schools that could not afford to stay open seven months out of the year 
on their own.44  Some thirty years later the State’s first modern school 
funding equalization act was passed.45  Then, in 1949, equity became a 
part of the school funding formula.46 
2. A Renewed Constitutional Commitment to State Funding 
Starting in the 1940s Kansas saw a boom in the number of school 
districts.47  This surge was not the result of organized efforts and resulted 
in administrative confusion and chaos.48  The state legislature soon began 
instituting reforms to try and organize the public-education system as 
well as to reduce the number of school districts.49  The legislature’s 
unification measures were challenged in court for unconstitutionally 
delegating legislative power to the superintendent.50  The legislature 
prevailed, but the case prompted a proposed amendment of Article VI.51  
The new Article VI language was not intended to supplant that of the 
1861 Constitution, but to provide “conceptual definition to the broad but 
                                                          
 41.  See USD 229, 885 P.2d at 1175 (“Act for the Admission of Kansas Into the Union, § 3 
(1861), included provisions providing that certain sections of land be reserved for educational 
purposes.”). 
 42.  KAN. CONST. art. VI, § 4 (1861). 
 43.  Berger, supra note 39, at 3. 
 44.  Id. at 4. 
 45.  Id. at 5. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. at 8. 
 51.  Id. 
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vague mandates of the first Constitution.”52  To be candid, the new 
language served to ensure local control of schools while making it clear 
that the legislature was in charge of shaping the “general course of public 
education and [providing] for its financing.”53  The result of all this 
careful balancing of interests was a complete replacement of the 1861 
Article VI language, but not its principles.54  The school finance 
language adopted in 1966 is that which we still use today: “The 
legislature shall make suitable provision for finance of the educational 
interests of the state.”55  Public education has changed many times 
throughout the state’s life, and it will certainly continue to change, but 
Kansans’ dedication to educating all our children remains steadfast. 
B. Nationwide School-Finance Litigation: Three Waves of Thought 
Commentators speak of the nation’s experience with school-finance 
litigation as coming in three waves: Federal equity, state-based equity, 
and adequacy.56  Equity litigation focuses on funding inequality between 
school districts that was caused by disparity in property values.57  
Adequacy litigation, on the other hand, focuses on the level of funding 
the state provides to all schools, regardless of relative district wealth or 
equitable distribution.58 
The first wave, federal equity litigation, was short lived.  Early 
equity advocates were inspired in part by the Supreme Court’s equal 
protection rulings regarding racial desegregation.59  In the 1960s 
education advocates began attacking state school finance systems under 
the Fourteenth Amendment.60  The seminal, and last, federal equity case 
came out of Texas—Rodriguez v. San Antonio started in federal court in 
1968 and ended with the Supreme Court in 1973.61  The Rodriguez 
                                                          
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  KAN. CONST. art. VI, § 6(b). 
 56.  Deborah A. Verstegen, Towards a Theory of Adequacy: The Continuing Saga of Equal 
Educational Opportunity in the Context of State Constitutional Challenges to School Finance 
Systems, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 499, 506 (2004). 
 57.  Richard E. Levy, Gunfight at the K-12 Corral: Legislative v. Judicial Power in the Kansas 
School Finance Litigation, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1021, 1026–27 (2006). 
 58.  Id. at 1033. 
 59.  ERIC A. HANUSHEK & ALFRED A. LINDSETH, SCHOOLHOUSES, COURTHOUSES, AND 
STATEHOUSES: SOLVING THE FUNDING-ACHIEVEMENT PUZZLE IN AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 88 
(2009). 
 60.  Id. at 89. 
 61.  Id. 
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plaintiffs argued that using local property taxes to fund schools created 
funding disparities based solely on wealth and violated students’ 
fundamental right to education.62  At the time, a few Supreme Court 
opinions had hinted at the idea that wealth may create a suspect class 
requiring heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.63  
However the Court rejected plaintiffs’ argument, holding that wealth is 
not a suspect class and the state only needed a rational basis for 
establishing the school-funding system it had—a standard easily met by 
state defendants.64  The Court also rejected the idea that education was a 
federal fundamental right,65 marking the end of school-finance 
litigation’s first wave. 
Equity advocates did not give up, however, turning instead to state 
courts—beginning the second wave of school-finance litigation.66  
Unlike the Federal Constitution, state constitutions often include 
education clauses.67  Advocates began arguing that their state 
constitutions required equitable school funding and enjoyed some 
success.68  Plaintiffs in sixteen states achieved success either in the courts 
or through a settlement before the case reached the state supreme court.69  
The goal of these cases was to decrease inequity in funding between 
school districts by bringing the bottom up.70  Unfortunately, not all 
states’ solution for equity problems had the degree of impact that 
advocates were looking for.71  By the 1990s the second wave of school-
finance litigation had lost favor and a new type of litigation began to 
appear.72 
The third, and current, wave of school-finance litigation focuses on 
funding adequacy.73  Again, advocates’ focus is on state-by-state 
litigation, finding an argument under state constitutions.74  State courts 
that found adequacy justiciable have found that their constitutions’ 
education provisions “impose an affirmative duty upon the state’s 
                                                          
 62.  San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973). 
 63.  Levy, supra note 57, at 1028. 
 64.  Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28. 
 65.  Id. at 37. 
 66.  Levy, supra note 57, at 1030. 
 67.  Id. at 1029. 
 68.  Id. at 1030. 
 69.  HANUSHEK & LINDSETH, supra note 59, at 92 tbl. 4.1. 
 70.  See id. at 91. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Levy, supra note 57, at 1031. 
 74.  Id. 
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legislature to provide an education.”75  The seminal adequacy case, Rose 
v. Council for Better Education, Inc., came out of Kentucky in 1989.76  
The Kentucky Constitution requires the legislature to “provide for an 
efficient system of common schools throughout the State.”77  The Rose 
plaintiffs argued that funding for Kentucky public schools was 
inadequate overall, even in the wealthiest twenty percent of districts.78  
The Kentucky Supreme Court focused on the constitution’s requirement 
of an “efficient” school system.79  The court held that for the school 
system to be efficient it must give students the opportunity for an 
adequate education, as defined by the seven Rose factors that are 
discussed in the next section.80  Finding the Kentucky school-finance 
system unconstitutional, the court required the legislature to increase 
funding and even mandated how property taxes could be levied in a new 
finance system.81  Many advocates in other states were encouraged by 
the Rose plaintiffs’ success and quickly began filing adequacy suits.82  In 
the 1990s and early 2000s plaintiffs in adequacy suits enjoyed great 
success—in the courts.83  However, adequacy suits lost steam in 2005 
following judgments for defendants in Texas and Massachusetts.84 
C. Kansas School-Finance Litigation: And Miles to go Before we Sleep 
Kansas’s tumultuous history with school-finance litigation is par for 
the course nationally.  Kansans started going to the courts for education 
reform in the 1970s.85  None of the early cases made it to the Kansas 
Supreme Court; instead, the legislature stepped in and responded to the 
plaintiffs’ concerns.86  In one of Kansas’s first school funding cases, 
Caldwell v. Kansas,87 the district court found the education-funding 
system unconstitutional on equal protection grounds.88  The legislature 
                                                          
 75.  Id. 
 76.  790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989). 
 77.  KY. CONST. § 183. 
 78.  Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 198. 
 79.  Levy, supra note 57, at 1032. 
 80.  Id. at 1032–33. 
 81.  Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 215–16. 
 82.  See HANUSHEK & LINDSETH, supra note 59, at 105. 
 83.  See id. at 107 tbl. 4.2. 
 84.  Id. at 105. 
 85.  Levy, supra note 57, at 1034 n.60. 
 86.  Id. at 1034. 
 87.  No. 50616, slip op. (Kan. Dist. Ct. Johnson Cnty. Aug. 30, 1972). 
 88.  Levy, supra note 57, at 1035. 
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quickly responded, passing the School District Equalization Act and 
warding off future litigation by the plaintiffs—for the time being.89 
Over the next twenty years, Kansas school-finance litigation 
followed much the same path as Caldwell.90  It was not until 1994, in 
Unified School District No. 229 v. Kansas91 (USD 229), that the Kansas 
Supreme Court heard a school-finance case.92  In the twenty years since 
USD 229, the court has heard two protracted school finance cases: 
Montoy v. Kansas93 and the yet unresolved Gannon v. Kansas.94 
1. Unified School District No. 229 v. Kansas 
USD 229 was the case that started it all in Kansas.  The legislature 
had responded to early school-finance litigation by enacting the School 
District Finance and Quality Performance Act (Quality Performance 
Act).95  The Quality Performance Act, which is still in use today, requires 
school boards to levy a proscribed tax rate on all taxable tangible 
property within the district in order to support local schools.96  The 
proceeds from this tax generally go to the district’s general operating 
fund, with the portions exceeding the “state financial aid” figure being 
returned to the state general fund.97  The “state financial aid” figure is 
arrived at by allowing each district a dollar amount per student, 
determined by the given year’s Base State Aid Per Pupil (BSAPP), 
multiplied by statutory weighting factors that are designed to provide 
additional resources to underprivileged districts and students.98 
USD 229 was brought in response to the Quality Performance Act.99  
Plaintiffs argued that, among other things, the Quality Performance Act 
did not provide suitable funding and violated the state’s equal protection 
                                                          
 89.  Id. 
 90.  See id. at 1035–37 (discussing cases from 1972 to 1994). 
 91.  885 P.2d 1170 (Kan. 1994). 
 92.  Levy, supra note 57, at 1034, 1038. 
 93.  Montoy v. Kansas (Montoy I), 62 P.3d 228 (Kan. 2003). 
 94.  Gannon v. Kansas, 319 P.3d 1196 (Kan. 2014). 
 95.  Levy, supra note 57, at 1034. 
 96.  Unified Sch. Dist. No. 229 v. Kansas, 885 P.2d 1170, 1178 (Kan. 1994). 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id.  Weighting factors affect the aid a school receives by proscribing a number by which to 
multiply the BSAPP.  This number corresponds to the number of students a school district has that 
falls within a category that the legislature has deemed in need of extra resources, such as bilingual 
students, at-risk students, low-enrollment districts, and so on.  See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-6411 to  
-6415a (2013), repealed by Act of Apr. 2, 2015, ch. 4, 2015 Kan. Laws S.B. 7 (listing weighting 
factors and how they are used in the Quality Performance Act). 
 99.  USD 229, 885 P.2d at 1178, 1182. 
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clause.100  The court held that the Kansas Constitution’s mandate that the 
legislature provide “suitable provision for finance”101 was similar to 
other states’ constitutional requirements of adequacy.102  However, the 
court refrained from articulating an adequacy standard stating that “[it] is 
well settled that courts should not substitute judicial judgment for 
educational decisions and standards.”103  Instead of crafting judicial 
adequacy standards, the court deferred to the legislature’s accreditation 
standards that applied to all Kansas public schools.104  The legislature’s 
accreditation standards were similar to judicially created adequacy 
standards from other states and provided a fool-proof method of 
determining whether funding to a school was adequate—was the school 
accredited?105  In addition to upholding the Quality Performance Act as 
adequate, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ equal protection challenge 
finding that school finance is a complex issue on which the legislature 
should be given great deference and that, in this case, the Act bore a 
reasonable relationship to the legislature’s Article VI duties.106  The 
Kansas school finance scheme survived USD 229, but it would not last 
long. 
2. Montoy v. Kansas 
In 1999, the Quality Performance Act inspired another court 
challenge, this time in Montoy v. Kansas.107  The Montoy plaintiffs 
challenged the Quality Performance Act on many grounds.  First, 
plaintiffs alleged that the Act created wealth-based disparity between 
districts violating equal protection.  Second, they alleged that these 
funding disparities lacked any rational basis to a legitimate state interest.  
And finally, the plaintiffs argued that the Quality Performance Act failed 
to provide funding to finance an adequate education for all students, 
violating the suitability provision of Article VI.108  It would not be unjust 
to call Montoy v. Kansas the case that would not end—it spanned four 
iterations over seven years.  An understanding of Montoy’s winding path 
                                                          
 100.  Id. at 1173. 
 101.  KAN. CONST. art. VI, § 6(b). 
 102.  USD 229, 885 P.2d at 1185. 
 103.  Id. at 1186. 
 104.  Id. at 1186–87. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Levy, supra note 57, at 1039. 
 107.  See Montoy I, 62 P.3d 228, 230–31 (Kan. 2003). 
 108.  Levy, supra note 57, at 1040. 
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is necessary before attempting to decipher Kansas’s most recent school-
funding decisions. 
Montoy I can be dispensed with rather quickly.  In light of USD 
229’s ruling that the Quality Performance Act was constitutional, the 
trial court in Montoy I dismissed all of plaintiffs’ claims.109  The Kansas 
Supreme Court, however, reversed the trial court’s ruling stating that 
USD 229 had clearly stated that the requirements of suitability under 
Article VI were not stagnant and could change with time.110  Plus, the 
legislative goals that the court in USD 229 had relied on to find the Act 
constitutional were no longer part of the State’s education-finance 
laws.111  Accordingly, the court remanded the case back to the trial 
court.112 
Then came Montoy II.  Interestingly, the trial court in Montoy II 
created a judicial standard for determining whether funding was adequate 
under Article VI’s suitability provision.113  The trial court noted that the 
standard was crafted in “the absence of any appellate court or even 
legislative suitability standard” seeing as the goals relied on in USD 229 
had been repealed.114  The case was appealed to the Kansas Supreme 
Court where the plaintiffs’ equal protection claims were dismissed 
because the Quality Performance Act did not create suspect 
classifications115 or have a discriminatory purpose.116 
The supreme court did, however, find that the Act failed to provide 
suitable funding to public schools and was unconstitutional because its 
weighting factors and other provisions were not based on the actual costs 
of providing students with an adequate education.117  The court also 
discussed how the Quality Performance Act’s infirmities forced middle- 
and large-sized districts with high populations of at-risk or disadvantaged 
students to rely on local-property tax revenue for general education 
                                                          
 109.  CALEB STEGALL, KAN. POLICY INST., A KANSAS PRIMER ON EDUCATION FUNDING 
VOLUME II: ANALYSIS OF MONTOY VS. STATE OF KANSAS 8 & n.31 (2009). 
 110.  Id. at 11. 
 111.  Montoy I, 62 P.3d at 234. 
 112.  Id. at 235–36. 
 113.  STEGALL, supra note 109, at 12 (the “total school funding must be such that it provides 
every Kansas student, commensurate with their natural abilities, the knowledge and skills necessary 
to understand and successfully participate in the world around them both as children and later as 
adults.”). 
 114.  Id. at 12–13. 
 115.  “A statutory classification based on race, national origin, or alienage, and thereby subject to 
strict scrutiny under equal-protection analysis.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1675 (10th ed. 2014). 
 116.  Montoy v. Kansas (Montoy II), 120 P.3d 306, 308 (Kan. 2005). 
 117.  Id. at 308–09. 
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funding when it was meant only for extra expenses.118  This discussion 
touched on the inequities created by the Act, but was not the basis for the 
court’s ultimate decision that the Act failed to provide finance for an 
adequate education.119  The court stayed the effects of its decision in 
order to give the legislature time to amend the Quality Performance Act 
to comply with the court’s opinion.120 
Although, the legislature amended the Quality Performance Act in an 
attempt to comply with Montoy II, appropriating an additional $142 
million for schools, that did not satisfy the court in Montoy III.121  Again, 
the court held that the Act violated the suitability provision of Article 
VI.122  The court found that, as amended, the Quality Performance Act’s 
weighting factors still exacerbated, or failed to minimize, inequities 
between districts and that an adequate amount of funding still had not 
been appropriated.123  The amount of funding required was controlled by 
a study the legislature had requested during the early days of the 
litigation and called for over $800 million in additional funding.124  The 
court retained jurisdiction over the case, threatening to enjoin the Quality 
Performance Act if the legislature did not take steps to provide an 
additional $285 million for the coming year.125  Thus ended Montoy III. 
Montoy IV, the final Montoy, came after a time of strife between the 
legislature and court that was caused by the court’s ruling in Montoy 
III.126  During a special session in July of 2005, the legislature finally 
reached a consensus and passed a school-funding bill that satisfied the 
court—for the time being.127  The last-minute bill called for an additional 
$285 million for the 2005–2006 school year.128  Though this amount was 
exactly what the legislature had been ordered to authorize, the court 
retained jurisdiction of the case to ensure the coming year’s school-
funding bill was also adequate.129 
Montoy IV was not dismissed until the Kansas Supreme Court found 
that the legislature had substantially complied with its order in July of 
                                                          
 118.  Id. at 310. 
 119.  Id. at 310–11. 
 120.  STEGALL, supra note 109, at 19. 
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 123.  STEGALL, supra note 109, at 20–21. 
 124.  Id. at 21. 
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 126.  Levy, supra note 57, at 1046. 
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 128.  Id. at 1046–47. 
 129.  Id. at 1045–46. 
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2006 and that the new funding formula was so altered from that in 
Montoy I that it was no longer properly before the court.130  After seven 
years the battle was finally over, but most Kansans were left wondering 
what we had to show for it.  The court’s opinion in Montoy left many 
with more questions than answers.  The court did not provide a clear test 
for adequacy and introduced the idea that equitable funding is also 
required by the Kansas constitution.131  These questions would not be 
resolved for another nine years. 
3. Gannon v. Kansas 
In 2014 the Kansas Supreme Court heard a school-finance case for 
the third time in twenty years: Gannon v. Kansas.132  The Gannon 
plaintiffs argued that the Kansas legislature failed to provide 
constitutionally adequate funding for public schools.133  The plaintiffs 
alleged that in reducing or withholding state aid, the legislature created 
unconstitutional inequity among school districts by forcing schools to 
rely on the money they could raise through local-property taxes—
revenues that vary greatly across the state.134 
Unlike USD 229 and Montoy, the plaintiffs in Gannon did not 
challenge the Quality Performance Act itself.135  Instead, the Kansas 
Supreme Court only heard challenges to the State’s withholding of 
capital-outlay aid and the prorating or withholding of state supplemental-
general aid.136  Capital-outlay aid is provided to help districts purchase 
things like equipment or new facilities.137  The amount of capital-outlay 
aid a district may receive is determined by formula and functions as a 
way to provide poor districts with state funds in an effort to shrink the 
spending gap between high and low property-wealth districts.138  State 
supplemental-general aid utilizes a slightly different formula but serves 
the same purpose—to better equalize spending power between high and 
low property-wealth districts.139 
                                                          
 130.  STEGALL, supra note 109, at 22; Montoy v. Kansas, 138 P.3d 755, 765–66 (Kan. 2006). 
 131.  Montoy II, 120 P.3d 306, 310 (Kan. 2005). 
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 134.  Id. 
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The Kansas Supreme Court’s opinion in Gannon answered many of 
Montoy’s lingering questions.  Namely, Gannon created clear tests for 
adequacy and equity in school-finance litigation.140  The Gannon court 
also explained that the state’s school-finance system must pass both the 
adequacy and equity tests to be constitutional.141  But, before the court 
could reach the merits it had to address the justiciability issues not 
litigated in Montoy or USD 229.142 
Montoy’s aftermath illustrated just how much tension school-finance 
litigation can create between the court and legislature.  That tension came 
front and center in the Gannon court’s opinion.  A considerable amount 
of the court’s time was spent analyzing whether adequacy was a non-
justiciable political question requiring the court to infringe on the 
legislature’s powers.143  The State argued that adequacy was non-
justiciable because school funding was constitutionally committed to the 
legislature and the court lacked judicially discoverable and manageable 
standards by which to judge whether the Quality Performance Act 
provided adequate funding.144  The Gannon court relied heavily on a 
school finance case from Texas when finding that the adequacy 
challenge did not present a non-justiciable political question.145  The 
court reasoned that the Kansas Constitution provided all the standards 
necessary to decide whether the state was adequately funding education 
or not, pointing the vague goal of “improvement” found in Article VI, 
Section One as the basis of their decision.146  In arriving at the conclusion 
that the vague goals of Section One provided standards enough, the court 
quickly noted that it is used to defining or applying vague or imprecise 
constitutional standards.147 
Upon reaching the merits, the court first clarified its previous 
holdings regarding adequacy.148  In Montoy, the court had approvingly 
quoted Rose v. Council for Better Education,149 but did not adopt its 
                                                          
 140.  Id. at 1236, 1239; see also infra notes 152, 158 and accompanying text. 
 141.  Id. at 1233. 
 142.  Id. at 1216. 
 143.  Id. at 1216–31. 
 144.  Id. at 1224–25. 
 145.  Id. at 1225–26. 
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 147.  Id. at 1228. 
 148.  Id. at 1233. 
 149.  790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989). 
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adequacy test.150  Rose outlined the following seven competencies 
required for an adequate education under the Kentucky Constitution: 
(i) sufficient oral and written communication skills to enable students 
to function in a complex and rapidly changing civilization; 
(ii) sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and political systems to 
enable the student to make informed choices; 
(iii) sufficient understanding of governmental processes to enable the 
student to understand the issues that affect his or her community, state, 
and nation; 
(iv) sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her mental and 
physical wellness; 
(v) sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each student to appreciate 
his or her cultural and historical heritage; 
(vi) sufficient training or preparation for advanced training in either 
academic or vocational fields so as to enable each child to choose and 
pursue life work intelligently; and 
(vii) sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to enable public 
school students to compete favorably with their counterparts in 
surrounding states, in academics or in the job market.151 
After a lengthy comparison to the Kansas legislature’s own 
educational goals, the court adopted the seven Rose factors as the 
minimum test for adequacy under Article VI.152  The court then 
remanded the adequacy issue, instructing the trial court to determine 
whether the school-finance system was reasonably calculated to have 
Kansas public-school students meet the Rose factors.153  The trial court 
recently found that “the Kansas public education financing system . . . is 
not presently reasonably calculated to have all Kansas” students meet the 
Rose factors.154  At the time of publication, how the State and courts will 
proceed is up in the air and, yet again, tensions are mounting between the 
legislature, executive, and judiciary.155 
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Prior to Gannon, the Kansas Supreme Court had alluded to requiring 
equitable funding distribution under Article VI, but had not developed a 
test or standard by which to determine whether funding was in fact 
equitable.156  Unlike adequacy, the court quickly arrived at an equity test.  
The court briefly cited previous cases expressing dissatisfaction with 
inequitable distribution of funds and the legislature’s own concern with 
education’s inequitable tax burden before adopting an equity test for 
school finance under Article VI.157  Now, the Kansas school-finance 
system must ensure that school districts “have reasonably equal access to 
substantially similar educational opportunity through similar tax 
effort.”158  Also unlike the adequacy issue, the court applied this new 
equity test to the merits of the case.159  The court found that the State’s 
reduction or withholding of supplemental-general aid and capital-outlay 
aid violated the equity test by creating unreasonable wealth-based 
disparity between school districts and was therefore unconstitutional.160  
It was left to the legislature to determine how best to rectify the inequity 
its actions had created.161  In April 2014, the Kansas legislature passed a 
$129 million funding package in an effort to comply with the Gannon 
court’s equity ruling.162  Two months later, the trial court ruled that the 
new funding was sufficient to meet Gannon’s equity requirements, 
ending the equity leg of the litigation.163 
The nationwide waves of school-finance litigation can be seen in the 
evolution of Kansas’s own struggle.  In 1994, USD 229 failed in its 
                                                          
THE KANSAS CITY STAR (Feb. 7, 2015, 5:09 PM), www.kansascity.com/news/local/news-columns-
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equity challenge.  Then, in 1999, Montoy began its fight for adequacy, 
culminating in a win for the state in 2006.  Finally, we arrive at Gannon, 
a hybrid of the two state-based waves but clearly focused on funding 
adequacy.  Where Kansas will go from here is still unclear, but one thing 
is for sure—school-finance litigation is here to stay. 
III. ANALYSIS 
Gannon’s adoption of a vague equity test provides advocates fertile 
ground for achieving greater equity among Kansas school districts.  
Whereas the Gannon court’s adequacy decision opened the floodgates to 
a world of judicial problems by reading Article VI as requiring the 
legislature to provide enough additional funding to create an 
“adequate”164 public education.  First I consider the non-justiciability of, 
and practical problems with, adequacy litigation; then I move on to 
examining the benefits of framing Gannon’s equity test as requiring 
vertical equity in school funding. 
A. Adequacy: A Study in Non-Justiciability 
Adequacy litigation poses many legal and practical problems that 
render the theory irreconcilably flawed.  Like many other state courts, 
the Kansas Supreme Court entertained an adequacy challenge all the 
while saying that determining the level of education spending is beyond 
its responsibility.165  Such courts overlook the fact that “adequacy cases 
by their very nature move courts into the policy arena” by forcing the 
judiciary to develop remedies historically in the purview of the 
legislature.166  The Gannon court’s treatment of adequacy overlooked the 
serious problems that come with creating policy in the guise of judicial 
remedies. 
1. Wherefore Art Thou A Political Question? 
Adequacy challenges to education funding under Article VI of the 
Kansas Constitution are non-justiciable political questions.  The political 
question doctrine is a non-justiciability doctrine based on separation of 
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powers principles.167  Although it is widely recognized that “separation 
of powers of government has never existed in pure form except in 
political theory,”168 the political question doctrine is a tool developed by 
the courts to protect the coordinate branches against ever being 
“controlled by, or subjected, directly or indirectly, to, the coercive 
influence of either of the other departments.”169  To that end, Kansas 
adopted the Supreme Court’s political question test found in Baker v. 
Carr.170 
A non-justiciable political question is present when one or more of 
the following Baker factors exists: 
[A] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a 
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and 
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding 
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial 
discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent 
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate 
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning 
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of 
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various 
departments on one question.171 
Litigation focusing on adequacy in school funding meets several of 
Baker’s factors for non-justiciability.  To begin, the adequacy of school 
funding is committed to the legislature, as supported by the lack of 
judicially discoverable and manageable standards.  Further, deciding an 
adequacy case would require the court to make a preliminary policy 
decision that defines what an adequate education in Kansas is, thereby 
showing a lack of respect for a coordinate branch—the legislature. 
a. As you wish—a constitutional commitment of school finance 
decisions 
The Kansas Constitution commits education-funding decisions to the 
legislature.  Article VI, Section Six commands that the “legislature shall 
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make suitable provision for finance of the educational interests of the 
state.”  The Kansas Constitution defines the state’s educational interests 
in Article VI, Section One: “The legislature shall provide for intellectual, 
educational, vocational and scientific improvement by establishing and 
maintaining public schools . . . .”  The constitution further commands 
that it is the legislature who shall organize the public schools and grants 
the legislature the power to change schools “in such manner as may be 
provided by law.”172  Reading these provisions together and giving them 
their plain meaning, as we are commanded to do,173 it is clear that the 
Kansas Constitution places the duty to fund schools on the legislature 
alone. 
It is true that the Kansas Constitution both “empowers and 
obligates”174 the legislature to provide funding sufficient to ensure an 
adequate education for public school children.  And it would be 
inconceivable to argue that such an obligation does not give rise to a duty 
enforceable by law.  However, it is not the duty to fund schools that 
adequacy advocates challenge, but the manner in which the legislature 
chooses to do so—a very different matter indeed.  When the Kansas 
Constitution solely empowered the legislature to “make suitable 
provision for finance”175 it did not place any restrictions on how the 
legislature was to do so, the constitution merely directed the legislature 
to provide funding in such a way as to attain the state’s educational 
interests.176  By leaving it to the legislature to determine what policies 
will achieve the constitution’s goals of “intellectual, educational, 
vocational and scientific improvement,” the constitution is leaving to the 
legislature the decision about how best to fund schools in order to 
achieve those goals.  It is well-settled law that discretionary actions 
performed by a coordinate branch of government are considered political 
in nature, and are not to be disturbed by the judiciary.177  Had the 
constitution placed limits or requirements on how the legislature was to 
attain the state’s educational interests, it would be another matter 
entirely.178  But here that is not the case.  The Kansas Constitution leaves 
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it to the legislature to determine how, and thereby how much, to fund 
public schools.  Such a textual commitment weighs strongly against the 
justiciability of adequacy in Kansas. 
b. Suitable is to discoverable as light is to dark 
That the adequacy of school funding is textually committed to the 
legislature is further bolstered by the concept’s lack of judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards.179  Judicially discoverable 
standards are lacking if constitutional text and history do not provide the 
court with standards by which to review the actions of another branch or 
if the constitutional text “lacks sufficient precision to afford . . . [a] 
standard of review.”180  In addition, courts have considered the lack of 
qualitative standards, especially in the realm of school-finance litigation, 
to indicate a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards.181 
The Kansas Constitution fails to provide qualitative standards, it 
merely sets the goal toward which the legislature should aspire in 
providing funding—the educational improvement of Kansas children.  
Article VI requires the legislature to make “suitable provision for 
finance”182 for the state’s educational interests, which are broadly defined 
as “intellectual, educational, vocational and scientific improvement.”183  
The constitution does not go on to ascribe standards by which to measure 
“improvement”—that is left to the legislature.  Because the constitution 
does not define “improvement,” it does not tell the legislature what it is 
supposed to provide “suitable provision for finance” for.  The vagueness 
of Article VI has left the court without a guide for what “suitable 
provision of finance” means;184 thereby leaving the judiciary without a 
textual standard against which to weigh the legislature’s appropriation 
decisions and without a textual standard for what the framer’s intended 
“suitable” to mean. 
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In addition to lacking textual standards, the term “suitable” is too 
vague to provide the court with any meaningful standard on which to 
base a determination.  In fact, the Kansas Supreme Court recognized the 
lack of judicially discoverable standards for adequacy in USD 229.  
There, the court affirmed the district court’s finding that suitability 
permitted of many varying definitions and did not “imply any objective, 
quantifiable education standard against which schools can be measured 
by a court.”185  As previously discussed, the court in USD 229 deferred to 
the legislature’s definition of suitability as enacted in the school 
accreditation requirements.186  The court did not adopt the legislature’s 
definition; instead, it reasoned that all schools meeting the legislature’s 
accreditation requirements were being suitably funded.187  The Kansas 
Supreme Court in USD 229 did not purport to define “suitable” as it 
exists in the constitutional text.  Instead, the court relied on the 
legislature’s definition of an adequate education—suitable was, and is, 
too vague a term to prop up a judicial doctrine. 
The Gannon court was also without historical precedent as a basis 
for reviewing the legislature’s actions.188  Although suitability had been 
touched upon in USD 229 and Montoy, the court had never heard 
arguments against its justiciability.189  With no aid from constitutional 
text, common understanding of the term “suitable,” or reliable historical 
precedent—Gannon had to fabricate adequacy standards.  However, the 
Baker factor does not ask if the court can fabricate a judicially 
manageable standard, it asks if one is discoverable. 
c. What came first, the judicial decision or a policy determination? 
Perhaps one of the more troubling aspects of Kansas adequacy 
litigation is that it requires the court to make a policy determination 
before it can rule.  When the court is asked to rule on the wisdom of the 
legislature’s appropriations, it is asked to make a policy determination 
that is outside the judiciary’s powers.190  Only questions concerning the 
legality of appropriations are justiciable.  Modern adequacy litigation 
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asks the court to pass judgment on the wisdom of the legislature’s school 
funding appropriation without adequate legal standards to do so. 
As previously stated, the Kansas Constitution does not provide the 
legislature, or the judiciary, with a rubric for achieving the state’s 
educational goals.191  So, one is left to wonder: Did the legislature 
provide “suitable provision of finance” for what?  The state’s educational 
interests.  What are the state’s educational interests?  Improvement.  
What is required to attain “improvement?”  I do not know, the 
constitution does not say. 
Here is where the court arrives at the chicken-and-the-egg 
conundrum.  The court does not have a standard against which to judge 
whether the legislature has made “suitable provision for finance.”  In 
order, then, to decide whether school funding is suitable the court must 
first determine what form of education will meet the Kansas 
Constitution’s goals of improvement—thereby making a policy 
determination.192  Without this initial policy determination, the court 
would not have a guide for what kind of education the constitution 
requires, which means the court could not determine how much money is 
required to provide “suitable provision for finance.” 
d. Well now that was embarrassing . . . 
If meeting the preceding three Baker factors was not enough, 
adequacy litigation poses a nearly certain potential for “embarrassment 
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one 
question.”193  Adequacy litigation in Kansas has led to years of back-and-
forth between the courts, legislature, and even governor.194  If Kansas’s 
own troubles are not enough to illustrate the potentiality for 
embarrassment, New Jersey and New York’s experiences paint a pretty 
clear picture.195 
New Jersey’s fight for adequacy in education funding began with 
Abbott v. Burke, and has continued in its courts for nearly fifteen 
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years.196  The Abbott litigation began as an adequacy case in 1998.197  
The New Jersey Supreme Court required an adequacy standard be met in 
particular underprivileged districts, called the Abbott districts.198  As of 
2005 “the Abbott districts received approximately 57 percent of all state 
aid for K-12 education in New Jersey, even though they only enroll 
about 20 percent of the state’s pupils.”199  As of 2011, the Abbott 
plaintiffs were still litigating the adequacy issue in state court.200 
New York’s seminal adequacy case began in 1993, led by the 
Campaign for Fiscal Equity (CFE).201  The first CFE case resulted in the 
court requiring New York to fund a “basic” education.202  The case was 
remanded for the trial judge to determine what level of funding would 
meet the state’s new adequacy standard.203  The trial judge ordered the 
state to increase education funding by $23 billion in five years.204  Over 
the next thirteen years, the case moved from court to court until, finally 
in 2006, the New York Court of Appeals significantly lowered the 
amount due by the state.205  In an interesting turn of events, the Governor 
and legislature came together and negotiated a settlement that satisfied 
all parties.206  After nearly thirteen years of litigation, “plaintiffs finally 
got what they wanted through the political process they had so diligently 
attacked in court as broken” when the newly elected governor brokered a 
deal within the legislature to fund New York City schools at nearly four 
times what the court had ordered.207  It would be unjust to attribute 
CFE’s resolution entirely to the political process, as the protracted 
litigation surely contributed to the legislature’s willingness to increase 
funding.  However, the political resolution to New York’s education-
litigation woes illustrates the necessity of legislative buy-in—a scenario 
made less likely with the hearing of each new adequacy case. 
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e. There will be little rubs and disappointments everywhere, especially 
in politics 
Proponents of adequacy litigation argue that the issue does not 
present a political question.  After all, financing for public schools is in 
the constitution.208  And, as Chief Justice Marshall wrote over 200 years 
ago, it is “emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department 
to say what the law is.”209  Alas, sometimes “the law is that the judicial 
department has no business entertaining the claims . . .” brought before 
it.210 
The Gannon court argued that because at some point funding could 
be so low as to clearly be unsuitable, there was no political question.211  
Though calculated to be persuasive, such reasoning does not require a 
finding that the term “suitable” provides judicial standards or that 
adequacy challenges under Article VI do not pose political questions.  
Kansas citizens are not completely without judicial recourse under 
Article VI.  If the legislature was to completely forgo funding public 
schools or to fund them at such abhorrently low levels that its 
appropriation bore no reasonable relationship to educational 
improvement, a challenge under Article VI could be justiciable.  The 
term “suitable” does not impose a textual limit on the legislature’s 
authority to set school finance policy, but the constitution’s use of the 
word “shall” requires the legislature to fund schools.212  Judging whether 
the legislature is providing funding to schools is not a political question, 
the political question arises when adequacy litigation asks the court to 
pass judgment on the wisdom of the legislature’s appropriations.  Thus 
presenting a non-justiciable political question. 
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2. The Practical Problem with Adequacy 
Not only does adequacy present the judiciary with a non-justiciable 
political question, it fails as a remedy.  At its roots, the adequacy 
argument seeks to provide each student with nothing more than “a high 
minimum.”213  Yes, providing all students with some form of adequate 
education is laudable, but it fails to achieve the goal of better educating 
our children—of statewide educational improvement.  Adequacy 
litigation seeks more money, focusing on a false remedy—the money 
myth.214  The call for more funding as the way to fix America’s 
education problem is not new, this debate has been going on since the 
1800s.215  But more money alone will not, and has not, fixed the 
problem.216  Inequality in resources and outcomes has not changed as a 
result of the staggering amount of money poured into school districts, nor 
has the need for meaningful education reform.217 
One needs to look no further than Kentucky, adequacy’s birthplace, 
to see that adequacy does not solve education’s funding problems.  The 
state legislature enacted the Kentucky Education Reform Act of 1990 
(KERA) in response to the Rose decision.218  KERA authorized a forty 
percent increase in spending, a windfall for plaintiffs’ cause.219  
However, student performance did not improve in any significant way.220  
In fact, between 1992, when the spending increase went into action, and 
2007, black Kentucky students actually fell behind the national average 
in reading and math.221  Before the spending increase occurred black 
students were above the national average in both subjects.222  Another 
study, this one performed in 2003, found that Kentucky would have to 
spend another $740 million per year to meet the state’s court-created 
adequacy standard.223  In light of inflation, this number is likely to 
continue to rise for all of time, with no evidence that increased spending 
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has created a better education for the most disadvantaged Kentucky 
students. The adequacy trap is an easy one for courts to fall into, but 
should be avoided at all costs.  When courts focus only on adequacy they 
focus on the total dollars spent on education, distracting the legislature 
from where the real problems in education lie—inefficiency, curriculum, 
socioeconomic inequities, and so on. 
One commentator noted that, when it comes to adequacy litigation, 
“[w]ell-intentioned judges have been persuaded to help solve one of the 
most important . . . problems the nation faces, aided in large part by 
plausible-sounding solutions.”224  Providing an adequate education to our 
children is something of a siren’s song—beautiful and alluring, but 
always a trap. Unfortunately, Kansas has fallen victim to her song and 
stands poised to follow Kentucky, New Jersey, and New York into the 
bottomless pit that is adequacy litigation.  So if more money does not 
solve the problem, what will? 
B. Equity: A Many-Splendored Thing 
Though Kansas courts had been determining whether school-finance 
legislation was constitutionally equitable since the 1970s, the state’s 
highest court had not pronounced a cohesive rule.  Gannon changed all 
that.  Now, as Kansas legislators craft school-finance policy they must 
bear the following test in mind: “School districts must have reasonably 
equal access to substantially similar educational opportunity through 
similar tax effort.”225  At first glance the Gannon test appears so 
ambiguous as to render it useless: What is substantially similar 
educational opportunity?  Equity advocates, however, may find the test’s 
ambiguity to be its most appealing trait.  The Gannon test leaves room to 
focus on more than one facet of equity and to consider more than money 
when defining educational opportunity. 
Equity litigation does not suffer from the same justiciability 
problems as adequacy because equity in school finance has been a part of 
Kansas’s history since its territorial constitution.226  Although Article VI 
as we see it today no longer contains the word “equitable,” the 1966 
revisers of the constitution did not intend to remove the principle.227  In 
fact, equity has been considered part and parcel of Kansas education 
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litigation since the 1950s with Brown v. Board228 and school-finance 
litigation since the 1970s.229  Even if Kansas did not have historical 
precedent to consider equity cases based on Article VI, it is well known 
that the courts have a long history of reviewing and resolving equity 
based litigation.230  Furthermore, equity challenges allow the court to 
utilize equal protection analysis in order to reach and decide the 
merits.231  Therefore it is no surprise that the Gannon court did not waste 
anytime concerning itself with the justiciability of plaintiffs’ equity 
argument.  Now that Kansas courts have adopted an equity test, the 
question becomes what kind of equity should the courts focus on? 
1. Horizontal and Vertical Equity Defined 
Before proposing what equity should mean in Kansas school-finance 
litigation, one must first understand what equity is.  Equity is a broad 
concept encompassing many areas but can be generally understood as a 
“body of principles constituting what is fair and right.”232  Equity comes 
in many forms, but those most important to school finance are horizontal 
and vertical equity.  Horizontal equity aims to decrease disparity between 
similarly situated school districts.233  Vertical equity aims to treat 
differently situated districts differently by moving the bottom up.234  
Scholars today believe that horizontal equity should not be the courts’ 
only focus; instead, the courts should focus on vertical equity.235 
The first and second waves of school-finance litigation focused on 
horizontal equity.236  Much of the dissatisfaction surrounding early equity 
litigation was the result of misinformation.  Many believed that equity 
litigation resulted in a race-to-the-bottom effect.237  This concern was 
even voiced in Kansas by the USD 229 plaintiffs: “They [plaintiffs] 
acknowledge [that] there is a wide disparity in per pupil spending but 
argue the legislature is improperly cutting off the mountain tops to fill in 
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the valleys.”238  However, a study done in the 1990s found that court-
ordered equity reform actually reduced “inequality by raising spending at 
the bottom of the distribution while leaving spending at the top 
unchanged.”239  The second wave’s focus on horizontal equity made 
other positive gains that have gone overlooked by adequacy advocates.240  
A study done at the height of equity’s popularity found that court-
mandated school-finance reforms significantly decreased intra-state 
inequality by encouraging legislatures to increase spending in lower 
property-wealth districts without needing to decrease funding to the 
already high property-wealth districts.241 
Early advocates were attracted to horizontal equity because it treats 
all students the same, regardless of their home address—something the 
local-property-tax system does not do.242 Unfortunately, this means 
horizontal equity also does not take relative need into account.243  It 
simply raises all boats.  Although the courts’ focus on horizontal equity 
did make gains in improving school finance, the concept could only take 
them so far.  A comprehensive approach to equity demands more than 
simply reducing inequity between school districts, it requires increasing 
equity of opportunity. 
Vertical equity places the focus on students by identifying groups of 
children that require more resources in order to receive educational 
opportunities similar to their peers.244  To do this, vertical equity ties 
input and output equity together, allowing for a more accurate and 
beneficial distribution of resources.245  Input equity is concerned with 
putting equitable resources into the school system whereas output equity 
is concerned with creating equity in educational outcomes.246  For 
example, achieving vertical equity would require that students whose 
first language is not English receive additional resources in order to learn 
English well enough to succeed in their other classes.  In this example 
the native-English speakers would not receive additional resources from 
the state while non-native English speakers would receive additional 
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state aid, but both groups would achieve the same outcome—similar 
opportunity to succeed in classes. 
An example of vertical equity in practice can be found in Title I of 
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.247  Title I,248 
formally entitled Improving the Academic Achievement of the 
Disadvantaged, is federal legislation aimed at increasing equity in 
education by providing additional funds to school districts with high 
numbers of students from low-income families.249  Another example of 
vertical equity in practice can be seen, though admittedly imperfectly, in 
parts of the recently repealed250 Quality Performance Act.  Many of the 
Quality Performance Act’s weighting factors serve to provide additional 
funding to schools with high levels of disadvantaged students.251  Both of 
these programs aim to increase equity by providing more to those with 
the least—vertical equity.  Analysts and theorists find vertical equity an 
appealing solution to many of education finance’s problems, but 
policymakers have been reluctant to institute such reforms.252  Why?  
Because creating an accurate funding formula that considers both what is 
put into schools and how those resources produce outcomes is difficult, 
but not impossible.253 
2. Equity and Understandings of Educational Opportunity 
Gannon’s equity test speaks of equity in “educational opportunity” 
but does not define it.254  Here is where advocates may find the test’s 
ambiguity beneficial.  Educational opportunity can encompass any 
number of resources: money, teachers, technology, classes, the list is 
endless.  Educational opportunity also encompasses several methods of 
achieving equitable distribution.255  There are four ways of looking at 
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equity in educational opportunity, each falling under the tenets of 
horizontal or vertical equity.256 
The first horizontal equity method requires each school district 
receive the same level of funding.257  This method does not take into 
account that some students may need more resources in order to succeed, 
but is the easiest to administer.258  This method’s focus is on equality in 
funding not equity, meaning that every school district would receive the 
same dollar amount from the state regardless of how much money is 
raised by the district’s local property taxes.  By uniformly raising the 
amount of state aid to districts, the gap in resources would remain the 
same.  Except now the poor schools would be a bit less poor and the 
wealthy school districts would be a bit wealthier.  Because of this, 
virtually no one supports the purely horizontal equity approach.259 
The second horizontal equity method, sometimes called the “‘do no 
harm’ principle,” incorporates some aspects of vertical equity.260  The 
“do no harm” principle focuses on allocating funding so that the school 
system does not increase the inequity that exists between students when 
they walk through the school doors on the first day of class.261  Explained 
more plainly, this method would ensure that “after the completion of K-
12 education, children will occupy the same rank in the distribution of 
human and social capital as their parents.”262  They leave school in 
exactly the same position as they entered it.  Heard this way many of us 
would cringe, is it not the point that our children end up better off than 
ourselves? 
Vertical equity provides us with two, more palatable options for 
defining equitable educational opportunity.  One method aims to use 
educational opportunity to redress all background inequality, both social 
and physical.263  To achieve this, the state would have to provide enough 
funds to create, then carry out, an education system that compensates for 
physical disabilities, a student’s bad home-life, mental disabilities, and 
anything else that could effect a child’s education.  More than just 
providing extra resources to help cope with these factors that impede 
educational performance, the state would have to ensure all children had 
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equity in educational outcomes as well.  In light of all the considerations 
and variables involved, this method is overly aggressive and would 
require inordinate amounts of financial resources and human capital.  It 
is of little surprise that this radical conception of vertical equity in 
educational opportunity is not widely supported. 
A second method of utilizing vertical equity in educational 
opportunity is gaining ground with advocates and academics.264  This 
method seeks to use educational resources to redress “background social 
inequalities by directing additional resources to those students who are 
deemed needy.”265  The focus would be on redressing background social 
inequities266 such as language proficiency, income level, and access to 
early childhood education.267  This second vertical equity option can be 
seen in parts of Kansas’s own school-finance system through the 
weighting factors included in the Quality Performance Act: “bilingual 
education students, vocational education students, at-risk students, . . . 
and students who are transported.”268  Acting to redress background 
social inequities has become the accepted conception of vertical equity, 
and in fact in school finance equity.  And for obvious reasons, leaving 
our children as we found them is not the promise education makes.  By 
utilizing this second method of achieving vertical equity in education 
funding, and thereby in educational opportunity, we can provide that 
non-native English speaker with the same quality education as her native 
English-speaking classmate. 
C. Equity in Kansas School-Finance Litigation: A Thoroughly Vertical 
Understanding 
Kansas courts should refuse horizontal equity as a means for 
understanding educational opportunity and utilize the advent of an equity 
test to embrace the tenets of vertical equity.  Although Gannon’s equity 
test does not use the term equity, its creation and application are colored 
by the court’s background understanding of equity principles.  In school-
finance litigation to come, because there will be more, the courts should 
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consider whether schools have “substantially similar educational 
opportunity” through a vertical equity lens.  Kansans have recognized the 
importance of equity in education since 1861, be it in funding, access to 
schools, or in the steadfast belief that separate can never be equal.269  It is 
time the courts apply a modern understanding of equity in school-finance 
litigation that mirrors the image of equity embodied in our constitution.  
Equity does not necessarily mean equality.  But, the principles of fairness 
and justice that comprise equity demand more than ensuring the State 
provides every school district with an equal amount of additional 
funding.  Equity requires more of the judiciary than the restricted view 
implied in Gannon. 
1. How it was . . . 
The Gannon court’s road to announcing its new equity test was 
paved with notions of horizontal equity.  Although the court did not 
explicitly consider what “substantially similar educational opportunity” 
would require, 270 its language in arriving at the test reflects a “do no 
harm” understanding of educational opportunity.  The “do no harm” 
principle provides that whatever the state spends on education should not 
worsen the inequities between low and high property-wealth districts, but 
does not ask the legislature to increase equity.271  This means that 
students will leave in relatively the same place they entered—no better, 
no worse.272  Certainly such a system would not be designed to meet 
Article VI’s mandate that the legislature provide for educational 
improvement.273 
The “do no harm” rationale can be seen throughout the discussion 
leading up to Gannon’s pronouncement of an equity test.  The court 
repeatedly discussed the need for the legislature to avoid “increasing or 
exacerbating inequities” already inherent in the school funding system.274  
In holding that the denial, or reduction, of state capital-outlay and 
supplemental-general aid violated Article VI, the court stressed that a 
satisfactory remedy could only be had if the legislature acts to reduce 
inequality.275  When the court focuses on decreasing inequity and not on 
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increasing equity, it is speaking in terms of the “do no harm” approach 
we all disapproved of earlier—whether it intends to or not.  Advocates 
have the opportunity to ensure that the “do no harm” rhetoric in Gannon 
does not become law.  To aid in this endeavor, they have support from 
Kansas school-finance litigation of old. 
Throughout the Montoy litigation the court appeared to be concerned 
with the lack of vertical equity provided by the Quality Performance Act.  
At several stages of the litigation the district and supreme courts 
expressed concern with the Quality Performance Act’s weighting 
factors.276  The legislature had altered the weighting factors after the 
State’s success in USD 229.277  Because the alterations were based on 
political compromise and not careful consideration of the actual cost of 
educating students, the supreme court found the new factor’s violated 
Article VI.278  The Quality Performance Act’s weighting factors served 
to provide increased funding to disadvantaged schools, a core tenet of 
vertical equity.279  The court’s concern with the weighting factors’ 
validity showed a concern with whether the school-funding system 
complied with notions of vertical equity, even if the court was not aware 
of it.  However, as the litigation dragged on the court became less and 
less concerned with vertical equity as illustrated by Montoy III’s 
pronouncement that the State owed $285 million in additional school 
funding for the coming year.280  This focus merely on inputs while 
disregarding where the funds would go or what outcomes they would 
produce illustrates a shift back towards a horizontal equity approach. 
2. How it ought to be . . . 
In turning its back on adequacy issues and embracing a vertical 
equity approach to Gannon’s equity test, the Kansas judiciary will be 
better able to assist the State in carrying out the promises of Article VI.  
Adequacy litigation comes from an admirable place, wishing to provide a 
quality education to all students.  However, when the courts become a 
place for determining how much money makes an education adequate 
they infringe on the legislature’s power.  Not only does adequacy impose 
a separation of powers problem, it fails as a remedy.  Courts cannot craft 
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legislative policy; because of this the courts’ only recourse in hearing 
adequacy challenges is to require additional funds.  As evidenced in 
Kentucky and the nation as a whole, more money does not often make an 
education adequate.281  Adequacy fails to recognize that there are more 
things that go into crafting a quality education than money.  In addition, 
adequacy litigation inevitably pits the judiciary against the legislature, a 
scenario from which no good can come.  Montoy nearly led to a 
constitutional amendment limiting the powers of the judiciary, and 
Gannon has led the state right back to that terrifying cliff.282 
Although the judiciary is not sufficiently equipped to hear adequacy 
challenges, the courts are more than capable of determining whether a 
school-finance system violates principles of equity.  The court need only 
occupy its usual role of considering a law placed before it and 
determining whether it passes a test that is derived from the text of the 
Kansas Constitution and its history.283  The Kansas Constitution has left 
it to the legislature to determine how and how much to fund schools.284  
However, it is the duty of the judiciary to determine whether the 
legislature’s funding scheme is equitable.  To do this, Gannon developed 
an equity test: “School districts must have reasonably equal access to 
substantially similar educational opportunity through similar tax 
effort.”285  The crux of this test, and the measure of its future usefulness, 
is how the courts approach defining “substantially similar educational 
opportunity.”  As seen in the language of Gannon and Montoy III, 
Kansas courts have followed the national trend of focusing on horizontal 
equity when considering school finance cases, though likely 
unwittingly.286  If courts decide to approach defining what “substantially 
similar educational opportunity” means from a horizontal equity 
perspective, they will be adopting the “do no harm” principle.  Requiring 
the legislature to do no more than provide an education that leaves 
children in exactly the same position that they entered it in.287  This is not 
the Kansas understanding of equity and it does not aim to meet Article 
VI’s requirement of attaining educational improvement. 
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Kansas has been striving to improve its education system since the 
first schoolhouse was built in 1851.  But more than merely improving the 
education system as a whole, Kansans were concerned early on with 
providing additional resources to the disadvantaged.288  State funded 
special-education programs began in the early 1950s and in the 1970s 
Kansans realized the need for a curriculum that was more responsive to 
the individual needs of students.289  These accomplishments recognized 
the need to provide additional resources to disadvantaged Kansas 
students—the need for vertical equity.  That inherent desire to do more 
through education than causing “no harm” is still present today.  One 
need look no further than the inclusion of weighting factors in the 
Quality Performance Act.290  These weighting factors aim to provide 
additional resources to low property-wealth districts and disadvantaged 
students—the very definition of vertical equity. 
If the judiciary’s role is to ensure the constitution is being carried out 
and the constitution reflects the will of the people,291 then the judiciary 
should be informed by the tenets of vertical equity.  By considering 
whether school districts have access to substantially similar educational 
opportunity through a vertical equity lens, the court will be carrying out 
the principles embodied in the Kansas Constitution.  This would mean 
defining similar educational opportunity not to mean equal (or more 
equal) funding or similar curriculum, books, and buildings.  Instead, the 
court should question whether the school-finance system is crafted to 
redress certain background social inequalities such as income-level, 
English language proficiency, and other factors that can impede 
educational opportunity and be redressed through access to additional 
resources. 
Viewing the funding system in this way will not require the court to 
instruct the legislature on how much money to spend.  Instead, the court 
would be looking at how the legislature distributes the moneys it sees fit 
to provide.  We saw an example of this in Montoy II. There, the court 
required the legislature to base the Quality Performance Act’s weighting 
factors on actual costs, not just political compromise.292  It is important to 
note that the court did not instruct the legislature on what the weighting 
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factors should be.  Instead, the court found that the weighting factors 
were not distributing funds in accord with their vertical equity purpose 
and failed to do so because the legislature had not actually considered 
input and output equity in amending the law.293  The language of Gannon 
seemed to back track from Montoy II’s view of vertical equity.294  
However, the Gannon court was not specifically asked to look at the 
Quality Performance Act as a whole.295  Therefore, courts considering 
school-finance cases in the future are free to embrace a vertical equity 
approach to understanding educational opportunity and would be wise to 
do so. 
The will of the people and Article VI of the Kansas Constitution are 
best served by approaching the definition of “substantially similar 
educational opportunity” from a vertical equity perspective.  Although 
adopting this perspective may prove difficult at first, the difficulty will 
be small in comparison to the benefits it would afford Kansas students. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Kansas has a history of innovation, but it is far from unique in the 
realm of education litigation.  School-finance litigation began in Kansas 
in the 1970s and proceeded to follow the three national waves with few 
variations.  Unfortunately, the state’s highest court recently followed the 
nation down the rabbit hole that is adequacy litigation.  Once courts find 
adequacy justiciable there is no telling when the litigation will end.  But 
there is still hope. 
Kansas has the unique opportunity to utilize Gannon’s newly minted 
equity test to improve the state of public education.  The history of 
education reform in Kansas strongly supports viewing educational equity 
as requiring vertical equity.  Courts can further the will of the people and 
the constitution, by defining “substantially similar educational 
opportunity” from a vertical equity perspective.  In viewing Gannon’s 
equity test through a vertical equity lens, Kansans can arm our children 
with that most powerful weapon—a quality education. 
 
                                                          
 293.  See Montoy II, 120 P.3d 306, 310 (Kan. 2005) (discussing weighting factors). 
 294.  Supra Part III.C.1. 
 295.  Gannon, 319 P.3d at 1204. 
